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1. Introduction 
Agrarian contracts regulate production and distribution of surplus between rural households. 
With 66% of the population in a developing country like Nepal still depending on agriculture, 
according to the census of 2001, it is important to understand the distributive and productive 
implications of agrarian contracts. The contracts will tend to reflect a trade-off between different 
concerns. A sharecropping contract may, for example, represent a trade-off between the workers' 
incentive to shirk, which is counteracted by making the payment dependent on the production, 
and full insurance, which requires an income for the workers that is independent of production. In 
this case, the sharecropping contract might be constrained Pareto-efficient, subject to the worker's 
private information. Similarly, a long-term labor contract may be a Pareto-efficient contract 
between a landlord who needs labor for particular types of work during the peak season, and 
workers who would like to smooth their income between seasons. 
 We will look into a particular type of long-term labor contract, but in contrast to the 
dominating view that most agrarian contracts are constrained Pareto-efficient, we will argue that 
this contract was not Pareto-efficient. The bonded labor, or kamaiya, contract of the western 
plains of Nepal probably maximized the landlords' payoff rather than total surplus, and no 
credible side-payments were available. Based on our empirical findings, we provide a new 
definition of bonded labor as a contract that by its pure existence brings down the outside option 
of the laborers. We will argue that an effective intervention into bonded labor must establish a 
credible and exogenous outside option, which, to our mind, is what happened in Nepal in the year 
2000. The intervention led to a shift to sharecropping, which appears to be Pareto-efficient, but it 
probably reduced the landlords' payoff.  
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 We argue that even though a sharecropping contract may be constrained Pareto-efficient, 
the landlord can be even better off with a bonded labor contract, as long as the payment is 
sufficiently low. We will identify a set of explanations for why the workers accept the low pay, 
applying a simple model. The model is based on detailed information on a particular form of 
bonded labor, as well as information on the intervention and the post-intervention contracts. The 
model explains the choice of contracts pre- and post-liberation, and why the ban on bonded labor 
was effective. Applying the model we also argue that the ban led to a Pareto-efficient contract. 
The analysis is based on our interviews with ex-bonded laborers. 
 The permanent contract that we study in Nepal is denoted as bonded labor, and is a 
relatively inferior contract. The kamaiyas of the western plains of Nepal had annual contracts that 
were negotiated every year, and it appears that the majority changed landlords every 1-3 years. 
Although this may indicate that the bond was not so strong, the kamaiya contract still appears to 
have been quite exploitative, the husband had to work 12 hours a day year round, and in many 
cases the wife had to work as well during the peak season, and all this for a low and normally 
fixed pay. We will discuss why the landlords had the leverage to implement such an inferior 
contract, and how the government counteracted the leverage and made the liberation effective. 
 In section 2 we present theories of permanent labor contracts, and point out some gaps in 
the literature. In section 3 we present a simple model that fills the gaps. Section 4 presents 
empirical evidence that supports the model, while section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theories of permanent labor contracts 
The simplest contract between a landlord and his employees is a daily contract where the worker 
receives a fixed pay for a certain amount of work, which can be measured in hours, implying a 
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daily wage, or as a quantity, leading to a piece-rate. We know that a piece-rate contract may 
solve problems of moral hazard when the quality of the work can be monitored. However, the 
quality of the work is not always easily monitored, and in that case the payment can preferably be 
made dependent on the final output, as in a fixed rent contract. With such a contract the worker 
will bear all risk, and may require a risk premium to accept an offer from the landlord. The 
landlord can avoid paying the risk premium by offering a fixed payment every day throughout the 
year as in a permanent labor contract. But in that case, the problem of monitoring again arises. 
As Stiglitz (1974) first demonstrated, a risk-sharing contract, such as sharecropping, will 
constitute a compromise between full insurance and work incentives.  
 Irrespective of whether the landlord or the tenants run the farm, they will need flexibility 
when it comes to labor inputs due to fluctuating weather conditions. Lack of labor may be a 
constraint for particular tasks during the peak season. Bardhan (1983) demonstrated this 
additional motive for the landlords to offer permanent labor contracts to ensure that they have 
simple access to workers during the peak periods. Still, it will not be optimal to have permanent 
laborers available for all peaks in labor demand, and there will normally be a residual casual 
labor market in most villages. Depending on the task, casual labor will be paid per day, or by a 
piece-rate, as discussed above. 
 As different contracts may exist at the same time within a village, we expect the terms 
from the workers' point of view to be relatively equivalent. Complete equivalence would require 
full information on the landlord's hand when he makes his offers, which is not realistic. So, we 
would expect some surplus for the workers as they choose the most attractive alternative. Still, 
we expect the landlord to be relatively well informed about the local population, and thus be able 
to make offers that are relatively equivalent, such that the individual specific surplus will be 
limited. The landlords may also be able to design the contracts such that the workers reveal 
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additional information about their type by their choice of contract.1 In that case, the most 
effective workers may have an additional information rent in equilibrium, and we expect them to 
select the sharecropping contract, as effective work pays better with that contract. However, we 
will keep our theoretical model simple when it comes to risk and information, and only allow for 
moral hazard. We also assume homogenous workers, and as a result, all workers will be 
indifferent between the different contracts in equilibrium. 
 This far we have explained permanent labor contracts as a response to the workers' need 
for insurance, and the landlord's need for accessible labor during peak periods. This is the 
standard explanation for permanent labor contracts in the case of easily monitored labor efforts, 
see for example section 13.5.4 in Ray (1998), which is now the standard textbook in development 
economics. We will argue that these explanations are only parts of the picture, and point out a set 
of other motives for permanent labor contracts that contribute to the very low payments for these 
workers, and correspondingly high profits for the landlord. The explanations will be motivated by 
a simple model in section 3, and supported by our empirical findings as reported in section 4. The 
remaining part of this section gives an introduction to our findings, based on the existing 
literature. 
 Initially, we will point to a mechanism that will not be explained, but rather assumed in 
our model, that is, the first mover advantage of the landlord in a principal-agent model. In the 
model we assume that the landlord moves first and thus has the advantage of suggesting a 
contract to the workers. This is the natural choice in models of permanent labor contracts. 
However, as Bell (1989) discusses, bargaining models, and we may add competitive models, are 
obvious alternatives to principal-agent models, and the analyst will have to make a choice. 
                                                 
1 For variations on such screening models see Allen (1985), Hallagan (1978) and Shetty (1988).  
 5
Without further theory, economists choose the model they find most realistic for a particular 
setting, and in villages dominated by bonded labor it appears realistic to apply a principal-agent 
model. As economists tend to apply principal-agent models to study permanent labor, we also 
expect that the landlords know that permanent laborers are willing to accept rules of the game 
where the landlord suggests the contract. Knowing this, the landlords may have a second-order 
strategy, where a permanent labor contract is preferred to casual labor not only because of the 
present trade-off between permanent and casual labor contracts, but also because they know that 
casual laborers will work elsewhere during the lean season, and thus be exposed to outside 
options that may improve their future bargaining position. We will not go into this dynamic 
game in the present paper.2 We only assume that the landlord moves first, and the reader may 
keep in mind that the landlord can have an additional dynamic incentive to offer permanent labor 
contracts. 
 Within the model, we add two motives for bonded labor contracts that we have not seen in 
the literature. The first motive is related to the problem of moral hazard discussed above that may 
lead to a low quality labor input, and thus makes permanent labor relatively less attractive since 
the landlord must expect lower production. However, there is an equilibrium effect that 
counteracts this disincentive. The loss in production will normally be shared within the local 
economy. As production declines, the landlord will pay the workers less, and in equilibrium they 
will not only pay the permanent workers less, but also the casual workers will receive less. So, if 
the landlord offers permanent labor contracts as implicit insurance for the workers, then he knows 
that the workers may contribute less than sharecroppers, but they also have to accept a lower 
utility, as their outside option as casual laborers is worse in equilibrium. This finding requires that 
                                                 
2 Schaffner (1995) has a model along these lines. 
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the transaction cost structure is such that the outside option for permanent labor is not 
exogenously determined outside the village. 
 The second motive is related to the literature on interlinked contracts, for an early, but still 
relevant, introduction to this topic, see Bardhan (1980), as well as literature on interlinked 
relations, in particular triadic relations as modeled by Basu (1986) and supplemented by 
Hatlebakk (2002). The general finding in this literature is that contract terms for one transaction 
are made dependent upon other transactions. The payment in a labor contract may depend on the 
interest rate paid to the employer, or even, as modeled by Basu, on the interaction with a third 
agent in another market. If we generalize these findings and apply them to Nepal, we find that 
permanent labor contracts are linked up with consumption credit, but also quite different benefits 
such as grassing rights and access to drinking water, see Hatlebakk (2004). We will allow for 
such benefits in the model, and we shall see that the monetary term will be lower, as a 
compensation. So, there may not exist a net benefit for the laborer in equilibrium, but the landlord 
may benefit, since the costs of providing the benefits may be far below the monetary value of the 
benefits from the worker's point of view. This finding is similar to Bhaduri's (1977) description of 
non-marketable collateral. 
 To summarize, permanent labor contracts may entail very low payments, due to an 
implicit insurance premium, compensation for other benefits, as well as the workers' share in 
equilibrium of the cost of inefficient production. We shall see, in section 3, that even in the case 
of a major inefficiency, the landlord may benefit from, and thus decide upon, the bonded labor 
contract. In section 4 we will present the empirical finding that the governmental ban on bonded 
labor in Nepal led to a shift to sharecropping, and we will argue that this shift indicates that 
sharecropping was the Pareto-efficient alternative even prior to the government intervention, but 
that no credible side-payment was available. 
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3. Model 
We apply a simple principal-agent model, where the principal, a landlord, may share the surplus 
with the agent by way of a sharecropping contract that guarantees work incentives, or he may 
offer a fixed payment as in a permanent labor contract and thus implicitly charge an insurance 
premium. The model is a simple version of the incentive-insurance trade-off model in Stiglitz 
(1974). We add two additional motives for the permanent labor contract that is motivated by our 
empirical findings. The permanent laborer is tied up with the principal, and will have other 
benefits from this interaction than from a pure labor relation. These benefits may be interpreted 
as interlinkages as discussed for example in Bardhan (1980). As with insurance, the costs for the 
landlord of providing these benefits may be smaller than the monetary equivalent for the agent. 
So, the landlord may find it profitable to offer a permanent labor contract rather than a 
sharecropping contract, even though the expected yield may be lower due to a lack of work 
incentives. Also note that the contract the landlord offers will be Pareto-efficient, that is, the 
principal maximizes his payoff subject to a fixed reservation utility for the agent. This far, the 
model is standard, although it combines different strands of the literature. However, we add a 
third element to the model that introduces a potential inefficiency, and at the same time defines 
bonded labor as a contract separate from standard permanent (tied or attached) labor contracts. 
 That is, we assume that the outside option for the agent is not a fixed reservation utility 
that is exogenously determined, but rather an endogenous alternative that is determined by the 
wage for casual labor within the local economy. Casual labor is a residual category in our model, 
and the equilibrium daily wage is endogenously determined. The wage depends on labor demand, 
which in turn depends on the yield. In the model, the probability of a high yield depends on the 
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agent's labor effort, which in turn is higher for sharecroppers than for permanent laborers. The 
endogenous reservation utility makes the model different from standard principal-agent models.3  
 The model defines an extraordinary power of the landlord that enables him to influence 
the agent's outside option. This, in turn, implies that the landlord may offer a contract that is 
inferior to sharecropping. We will argue that this exposure to extraordinary power, which results 
in a contract that gives the agent a payoff that is below the ordinary reservation utility, is a useful 
definition of bonded labor. Any laborer that is, rather, exposed to an ordinary outside option will 
not accept the bonded labor contract, while laborers that are bound to choose between the 
available local contracts are in fact bonded.4 
 Compared to a standard principal-agent model, the new element of our model implies an 
endogenously determined reduction in the payoff to the permanent laborer, which redistributes 
income from the laborer to the landlord, and thus may appear as purely redistributive. However, 
the redistribution is necessarily linked to a shift to a less efficient contract system. The landlord 
will thus have a trade-off between efficiency and redistribution, where he himself receives the 
gains from redistribution, and he may decide on the less efficient bonded labor contract whenever 
this is the most profitable. Note that there is no side-payment available in this game, because any 
a priori promise from the laborer to accept a payoff inferior to the casual wage in the 
                                                 
3 A similar model, with endogenous reservation utility, is presented in chapter 10 of Chambers and Quiggin (2000). 
In that model the landlord bears a cost if he decides to exploit the laborer by way of certain activities (such as 
political pressure) that reduce their reservation utility. In our model the endogeneity is, in contrast, by way of a 
market mechanism. So, they study the implications of an endogenous reservation utility for the terms of the 
sharecropping contract, while in our model the reservation utility changes with the shift from bonded labor to 
sharecropping. 
4 Note that the model requires a high fixed transaction cost of working permanently outside the local economy, 
which makes local casual labor the profitable outside option for the bonded laborers. As a consequence, the model is 
most relevant for relatively isolated villages. Bonded labor as a result of lack of exposure to outside options is 
discussed by Schaffner (1995), but she models preferences rather than wages as endogenous. 
 9
sharecropping equilibrium will not be credible, since he may rather work as a casual laborer at 
the normal wage whenever the sharecropping alternative is established. 
 So, compared to a standard permanent labor contract, the redistribution defined by the 
endogenous outside option is in fact redistributive, and as a consequence, if the standard 
permanent labor contract is efficient, then the bonded contract will be efficient as well. However, 
we may also have the case where the sharecropping contract will be chosen in the case of an 
exogenous reservation utility, while the endogenous outside option implies a cost reduction for 
the principal that makes it profitable for him to offer a permanent (bonded) labor contract rather 
than sharecropping. So, the extraordinary power of being able to not only set the contract for the 
permanent laborers, but also influence their outside option, may make it profitable to offer a 
Pareto-inefficient contract that we define as bonded labor. We now present the model. 
 A principal, that is the landlord, owns land, and he may either rent out the land on a 
sharecropping basis, or hire permanent laborers.5 Production is stochastic, with two possible 
outcomes, a high yield hy , or a low yield ly . The probability of a high yield depends on the 
workers' efforts, with 1p  being the probability of a high yield if the workers are diligent, and 0p  
being the (lower) probability in the case of lazy workers. We assume that laziness pays off, and 
the landlord is not able to observe it, so a bonded laborer will always be lazy. 
 Daily workers constitute the residual category in this economy, and there will always be 
some of them, and they only work in the peak seasons. To simplify, we assume that the daily 
wage w is independent of the yield, but may depend on the equilibrium contract system, and we 
will use the sub-script s for sharecropping and b for bonded labor whenever we need to 
                                                 
5 There will be only one type of permanent labor in the model, and we use the terms permanent and bonded labor 
interchangeably. The model is applied to define a specific kind of permanent labor as bonded labor. 
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distinguish between the two wages. That is, the daily wage may not be the same in the two 
equilibria, but subject to a specific equilibrium, the wage will not depend on the yield. The 
amount of work during peak seasons will depend on the yield. In case of a high yield, they will 
work for hl  days, and in case of a low yield they work for ll  days. So, the fixed wage is only to 
simplify notation, the income of the casual laborers depends on the yield. We may interpret the 
fixed wage as a limited insurance, or as a means of avoiding an annual renegotiation of the wage. 
 A bonded laborer receives W for a full year of work. The payment is independent of labor 
efforts as the landlord knows for sure that the worker will be lazy, and the probability of a high 
yield hy  will be 0p . In the case of sharecropping, the worker gets a share (normally 50%) of the 
yield as his income, he will work hard as a result, and the probability of hy  will be 1p .  
 Now, traditionally a bonded laborer, kamaiya in our case, will also be tied to the landlord 
by other means. He may have a loan, and he may have a house on the landlord's land. The 
benefits of such contract elements we denote by B, which applies only to the permanent workers. 
A sharecropper or a daily laborer must go to others for loans and housing, and pay the market 
price. The daily laborers, for example, will tend to be unmarried sons of the kamaiyas who still 
stay in their parents' house. But, when they get married, they may need a loan and a house, which 
they can get as a part of the kamaiya contract. 
 We thus have two possible equilibria depending on what long-term contract system the 
landlord decides to offer. The landlord, and we as researchers, may solve his maximization 
problem backwards. First we identify the worker's optimal choice between a daily contract and 
the available long-term contract, where the latter is either a permanent labor contract or a 
sharecropping contract. Then, we identify the landlord's optimal offer subject to the expected 
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outcome in the second step, where we also take into account that the choice of long-term contract 
will affect the daily wage.   
 We shall see, in the empirical section, that most landlords offer the same contract, that is 
the kamaiya contract as long as this is an available option. With more than one landlord in the 
economy we must imagine that they collude and behave like a single principal. That is, there is 
no competition that may interrupt the landlords' power, which in this model is determined by the 
first-mover advantage. 
 We now look into the worker's choice between being a daily and a permanent worker. In 
this case we know that the probability of a high yield is 0p . The daily laborer may have the 
expected utility dEU = 0p u(w hl ) + (1 - 0p )u(w ll ), while the permanent worker will have the 
utility pU = u(W, B). However, we recall that the daily workers may work elsewhere in the low 
seasons, and thus get an additional income that we write, depending on the local yield, as hx  and 
lx  respectively. The utility equivalence for the worker thus becomes  
 
0p u( bw hl  + hx  ) + (1 - 0p )u( bw ll  + lx ) = u(W, B).  (1) 
 
Next, the landlord may alternatively rent out the land to sharecroppers, rather than hiring 
permanent laborers. A sharecropper may, in turn, have to hire daily labor during the peak season. 
Now, it is not clear whether a sharecropper will hire more or less labor than the landlord. On one 
hand a permanent worker may work long hours during the peak season, but on the other hand the 
sharecropper may work more efficiently. We keep the same amount of work in the model, since it 
appears that a separate notation will only make the model more complicated without adding 
insight. But recall that the probability of a high yield, and thus a high demand for labor, is larger 
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with sharecropping. Above we also simplified the wage setting by assuming that the wage is 
independent of the yield, but may depend on the contract system. With a higher expected 
demand, we thus expect a higher uniform wage with sharecropping. As this will follow from a 
simple market analysis, we do not provide a formal proof, but formulate the finding as Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1 
The wage for casual labor will be higher with sharecropping than with bonded labor as the 
permanent contract system.  
 
With sharecropping we do not only have a higher daily wage, sw  > bw , but also the larger 
probability 1p  of a high yield that replaces 0p  in the expected utility of the daily worker. The 
expected utility of the sharecropper we write as sEU  = 1p u( hπ ) + (1 - 1p )u( lπ ), where π  
denotes the profit from the plot they rent.6 The utility equivalence for the sharecropper now 
becomes  
 
1p u( sw hl  + hx  ) + (1 - 1p )u( sw ll  + lx )  = 1p u( hπ ) + (1 - 1p )u( lπ ).  (2) 
 
Although the probability 1p  is the same for the two alternatives represented in equation (2), the 
difference between the high and low yield outcomes may not be the same. We would expect 
smaller dispersion for the daily laborers, since they may work elsewhere in case of a low yield. 
So, if the potential workers have different risk preferences, then we may expect the least risk-
                                                 
6 Note that the profit will depend on the yield, the number of sharecroppers that contract with the landlord as well as 
the wage for daily labor. We assume a normal case, where profit is highest in the high yield case. 
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averse to end up with the sharecropping alternative in equilibrium. However, in a more realistic 
model we may specify lx  as uncertain, and the daily workers might be the least risk-averse. Also 
note that in a more realistic model the sharecropping contract, with a fixed 50% share, is more 
flexible than it appears. The landlord can easily adjust the payoff for the sharecropper by 
adjusting the size of the rented land. 
 From (1) and (2) we may now identify the three explanations, mentioned in section 2, for 
why we expect the payment W to bonded laborers to be low. We write (1) as  
 
0p u( bhW ) + (1 - 0p )u( blW ) = u(W, B) = u(Wˆ ) (1') 
 
which illustrates two effects. First, the cash payment W is smaller than the cash equivalent Wˆ  
that gives the same utility as the contract (W, B). This explanation may represent different 
varieties of interlinked contracts, as discussed above. Second, for any risk-averse agent the cash 
equivalent Wˆ  will, due to a risk premium, be smaller than the expected income for the casual 
laborer, 0p bhW  + (1 - 0p )( blW ). Both these explanations may explain the existence of different 
kinds of permanent (tied or attached) labor contracts, as discussed in section 2. 
 By comparing the payoff for casual labor in the two equilibria, that is, by comparing the 
left hand sides of (1) and (2) as we do in (3), we may illustrate the third effect, which we consider 
as the novelty of our model as formulated in Proposition 1. 
 
0p u( bw hl  + hx  ) + (1 - 0p )u( bw ll  + lx )< 1p u( sw hl  + hx  ) + (1 - 1p )u( sw ll  + lx )  (3)  
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The inequality is due to the fact that the casual wage is higher in the sharecropping case, as 
formulated in Lemma 1, and the probability of the high yield is larger. As a result we have 
Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1 
The fall-back option of being a casual laborer gives a lower payoff for the laborers in the bonded 
labor equilibrium than in the sharecropping equilibrium. 
 
We may now summarize the three parts of the kamaiya contract that all contribute to the low 
payment for the kamaiyas. 
 
1) There is an equilibrium effect, where the expected utility of the fallback alternative of being a 
daily laborer is lower for bonded labor than with sharecropping. 
 
2) Even without the equilibrium effect described in 1), risk aversion implies that the fixed 
monetary equivalent Wˆ  will be lower than the expected income from sharecropping. 
 
3) From u(W, B) = u(Wˆ ), we know that the actual payment W is smaller than Wˆ , because the 
permanent laborer is compensated by way of the other benefits in B. 
 
As said, the two latter effects represent contract elements that are discussed in the literature, 
respectively on insurance and interlinkages. However, the first part, as formulated in Proposition 
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1, we have not seen described in the relatively limited economic literature on bonded labor.7 Note 
that the lower expected utility for the casual laborers drives down the utility also for the bonded 
laborers in equilibrium. That is, if the landlord is able to implement bonded labor as the only 
long-term contract, then he is actually manipulating the outside option of the laborers. This is, in 
our mind, a useful definition of the extraordinary power that is necessary to enforce bonded labor 
contracts, that is, the ability of a powerful person to influence his trading partners outside option.8 
The triadic model formulated by Basu (1986) is also of this kind, see Hatlebakk (2002). We thus 
use this characteristic to make a distinction between tied/attached labor and bonded labor, as in 
the definition below. 
 
Definition 1 
Bonded labor is a permanent labor contract where the landlord, by way of offering only this as a 
permanent contract, also influences the laborers' outside option. 
 
Economists have struggled with finding a useful definition of bonded labor, and the one we 
suggest here is not only based on theory, but also on our findings during fieldwork among 
agricultural laborers who were recently released from a contract that most people termed as 
bonded labor. The definition is also, as said, supported by similar models of extraordinary power, 
and we feel the definition is reasonably robust. But, as it is a definition, we can only, as we do 
here, attempt to convince the reader that the definition is useful. 
 Now we turn to the landlord's optimization problem. We may compare the detailed payoff 
functions for the two long-term contracts, but this will not add to the analysis. From the summary 
                                                 
7 But see Chambers and Quiggin, op. cit. 
8 For a discussion of this, and related definitions of power, see Bardhan (2005). 
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above we know that with a bonded labor contract the landlord benefits from an insurance 
premium, the relatively low cost of providing the additional benefits in B, and the lower casual 
wage as described in Lemma 1. These cost reductions must be compared to the loss from a lower 
expected yield. The lower casual wage that is a result of the bonded labor contract implies that 
sharecropping becomes relatively less attractive, as compared to a standard principal-agent model 
with an exogenous reservation utility. We thus have Proposition 2.  
 
Proposition 2 
The existence of bonded labor makes the sharecropping alternative relatively less attractive for 
the landlord. 
 
Within our principal-agent model the landlord will thus offer bonded labor contracts as the only 
long-term contract, that is, whenever this gives the highest profit. But under what circumstances 
is the model realistic? In particular, the model requires that the outside option for bonded laborers 
is casual labor within the village. That is, the economic and social transaction costs of working 
elsewhere are too high. As the local economy develops, or the laborers are exposed to other 
contract forms, we may expect the fallback option to become exogenously determined outside the 
local economy, and thus the landlords to lose the extraordinary power that allows them to offer a 
bonded labor contract as defined in Definition 1. With an exogenous outside option, we are left 
with contract elements 2) and 3) above as in a standard labor contract. We formulate this 
conclusion as a corollary. 
 
Corollary 1 
Bonded labor will not exist if the laborers have an exogenously determined outside option. 
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As illustrated by the liberation of the kamaiyas in Nepal, a governmental intervention may 
establish an exogenous outside option that the landlords cannot manipulate. We will discuss the 
details of this intervention in the next section. 
 Note that with an exogenous reservation utility, the landlord's decision will be Pareto-
efficient, since his payoff is maximized subject to a fixed payoff for the laborers. But, if the 
landlord's decision affects the outside option for the laborers, as we model here, then he will be in 
a position where he may trade off efficiency for redistribution of income to himself. That is, 
sharecropping may be the Pareto-efficient choice for a fixed reservation utility, but with an 
endogenous reservation utility the landlord may rather choose bonded labor. This result is 
formulated in Proposition 3. Note that there are no available side-payments, a promise from the 
laborer to accept a payment below the reservation utility defined for the case of sharecropping 
would not be credible. That is, after a shift from bonded labor to sharecropping the casual wage 
has increased, and the laborer would be free to work for this higher wage.  
 
Proposition 3 
Bonded labor is the result of a trade-off, for the landlord, between an efficiency loss and a 
redistribution of surplus from the laborers. 
 
So, in this case a governmental intervention may not only improve the living standards of the 
laborers, but also economic efficiency. 
 As an introduction to the empirical section we now summarize a set of predictions from 
the theoretical analysis that we will investigate in the empirical section. 
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Hypotheses 
1) The kamaiya contracts were inferior to sharecropping. 
 
2) Pre-liberation, the daily wages in the kamaiya villages were lower than in comparable 
villages. 
 
3) Post-liberation, the daily wages in the ex-kamaiya villages do not differ from comparable 
villages. 
 
The hypotheses follow directly from the model. We will investigate the first hypothesis by direct 
comparison of the contract terms. Then, if we assume that villages without kamaiyas are in the 
sharecropping equilibrium, and keep in mind that any permanent contract will be equivalent to 
the daily contracts within each village, then we can investigate Hypotheses 2 and 3 by comparing 
daily wages between villages. 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
In this section we document the shift from bonded labor to sharecropping that was the result of a 
governmental intervention into bonded labor in Nepal. We also compare the terms of the two 
contracts, and we discuss why the intervention was effective. 
 In July 2000 the government of Nepal banned the kamaiya system of bonded labor 
contracts. The governmental declaration was the result of political pressure and documentation 
from human rights organizations, see INSEC (1996), Robertson and Mishra (1997) and the 
references in Table 1 for introductions to the kamaiya system prior to the liberation. The 
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organization BASE was particularly active in the process of liberation, for a personal account see 
Chaudhary (2000), and also see BASE (2001). In addition, the trade unions, human rights 
organizations, in particular INSEC, and the major opposition party UML played important roles, 
see GEFONT (2002). For a good chronology see Gurung (2004). In addition to the literature 
mentioned here, we conducted six weeks of fieldwork ourselves, interviewing ex-kamaiyas, other 
households in the villages and NGO activists.9 We also benefited from discussions with Shiva 
Sharma at the National Labour Academy, who has done extensive research on the kamaiyas, see 
Sharma and Sharma (2002), and references therein. 
 The liberation turned out to be an effective intervention into agrarian contracts, it was a de 
facto ban on bonded labor. Within a few days a majority of the bonded laborers left their 
landlords, and by the end of the annual contract period, almost all had left. Now, one may say 
that the kamaiyas were not bonded laborers, since the contract period was only one year. In the 
first week of the month of Magh the laborers negotiated a new contract, and they quite regularly 
changed landlord. If they had a loan, the next landlord would give a new loan, which the laborer 
in turn transferred to the previous landlord to pay of the loan. They also discussed the contract 
terms, where it appears that the work efforts of the wife and the amount and form of payment for 
food were the most flexible contract terms. And, they got a better contract if they had specific 
skills, which could be very particular skills. Also, it appears to be the case that the wife had to 
work more if they had a loan. Even though the kamaiyas changed employer regularly, and the 
contract terms were negotiated every year, the working hours were long, and it is quite common 
in Nepal, and among NGOs to term the kamaiyas as bonded laborers. 
                                                 
9 For details on the fieldwork see Chitrakar (2006). 
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 The liberation of the kamaiyas was followed up by other interventions, they received a 
plot of land and a house in separate camps, normally by clearing forest. Furthermore, they were 
not supposed to pay the loan to the landlord, and many did not pay. They were thus uprooted 
from the power structures within the village, and the landlords no longer had the same leverage, 
since the kamaiyas did not have to pay the loan, and moved away from the village. From our 
interviews with ex-kamaiyas, landlords and activists, it also appears that the landlords were 
afraid, and asked the kamaiyas to leave. In particular it appears that they feared that the 5 kattha 
land that the government had promised the kamaiyas would actually be taken from them.10 There 
was also a threat of legal punishment for those who kept kamaiyas. Furthermore, when the first 
group of kamaiyas received land relatively early, possibly due to pressure from NGOs, the 
remaining kamaiyas followed at the end of the annual contract period. 
 So we conclude that the intervention was effective, the government, with support from 
NGOs, was actually able to implement the ban on kamaiya contracts. The relocation, and the 
allocation of land and a house appear to have counteracted the leverage the landlords had over 
the kamaiyas. We will now go into detail on the kamaiya contracts and argue, based on the 
empirical information, that they were inferior to sharecropping. We also compare the contract to 
daily wage labor, and we report the change in agrarian contracts that have taken place as a result 
of the liberation. 
 There was a relatively large variation in the kamaiya contracts, and also some variation in 
the description of the contracts. We will thus present some previous descriptions of the variation 
in kamaiya contracts, as well as our own findings. Table 1 summarizes the contracts reported by 
different authors (with Nepali terms in brackets).  
                                                 
10 5 kattha = 135 x 135 sq.feet = 0.17 ha, which is approximately half the median farm size of Nepal. 
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 The last row summarizes our own findings. The findings are based on 81 interviews with 
mainly ex-kamaiyas, but also some kamaiya-hiring landlords and some present-day kamaiyas. I 
intentionally waited with the generalization that is reported here till after the data was entered. 
This was to prevent late entries being influenced by the early entries. When the raw data had been 
entered and summarized, I sat down for the first time with my main field assistant and asked 
about his general impression, which confirmed my findings. His impression was influenced by 
his own family's experiences as a kamaiya landlord. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
There appears to be an individual variation in the kamaiya contracts according to the ability of 
the kamaiya, and thus his outside option. Also, having a loan appears to affect bargaining power, 
although this finding is far from consistent. The variation seems to be in the amount of work for 
other family members, and whether they got a plot of land or a fraction of the production, there 
also appears to be variation in whether they got extra meals. But it appears to be some standard 
contracts that we summarize below.11 
 
1. The kamaiya gets a fixed amount of paddy (e.g. 720kg) + meals, and meals for the wife 
whenever she is working, which might be every day. 
 
                                                 
11 Thanks go to my field assistant Madhab Bhusal, who helped me to understand the confusing variation in the 
contract terms that were reported to us, as well as in other writings. He grew up in a village where kamaiya contracts 
were common. 
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2. One 1/4 or more commonly 1/3 of production from 1 - 2 bigha12 land + meals. 
 
3. If only the husband works, then the same fixed amount of paddy (e.g. 720 kg), but meals are 
replaced by masura, such that he can eat with his family. Masura is a fixed amount of paddy (e.g. 
680kg) + appr. 100kg other food items. Note that he gets some time off to go to his house for 
meals. 
 
Note that contract no. 2 is not so different from sharecropping when it comes to payment, since 
the meals compensate for the lower share of the production. However, the main difference is the 
working hours, as all kamaiyas had to work every day, 12 hours per day for the landlord, and the 
wives had to work, mostly in the peak seasons, and only for food. 
 My field assistant puts the value of meals at 15 rupees for a full meal, and 8-9 rupees for 
the afternoon roti snack. This is consistent with the difference in daily wages with and without 
meals. He also said that the kamaiyas usually get two full meals and the snack, which gives a 
value of 38-39 rupees for the meals. With a paddy price of 7 rupees, contract no. 1 thus gives a 
daily payment for the husband of approximately 52 rupees. Now, the wife gets only the meals, 
and women usually eat less, so the value of the female wage we may put at 30 rupees. 
 Contract no. 3 is most common for single kamaiyas who go home to their family for 
meals, and thus probably work less. If we put the value of the additional 100kg of food items at 
double that of paddy, then the daily pay becomes 31 rupees. So this kamaiya earns the same as a 
female kamaiya. These value estimates are based on present day prices. Now, the prices have not 
changed much, probably only increasing from 6 to 7 rupees for paddy. Applying this increase 
                                                 
12 1 bigha = 20 kattha = 270 x 270 sq.feet = 0.6773 ha. 
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also to the meals, then we have payments at the time of liberation in the year 2000 of 27 rupees 
for women and single kamaiyas, and 46 rupees for male kamaiya where the wife also works.  
 But the wage for daily labor has increased more than prices. According to NLSS (1996) 
and NLSS (2004), the median agricultural wage for the five districts where we find kamaiyas 
increased from 50 rupees in 1995/1996 to 80 rupees in 2003/2004. If we assume a linear growth, 
then we have an estimate for the daily wage of 67 rupees at the time of liberation. However, this 
median wage covers all villages in the district, and we expect that the daily wage in the kamaiya 
villages was lower prior to the liberation, in line with our theoretical model. To investigate this 
issue, we have identified the three villages in the NLSS (1996) dataset that had the largest 
proportion of kamaiyas according to a kamaiya census conducted by the Department of Land 
Reform.13 The mean wage in NLSS (1996) was 43 rupees for these three villages, which is 
significantly lower than the mean of 51 rupees in the other villages of western terai. This finding 
supports Hypothesis 2 from the theoretical section.  
 The median for the kamaiya villages was 40 rupees. If we assume the same increase here 
as in all districts, then the estimated median daily wage for these villages at the time of liberation 
would be 54 rupees. So, it appears that the kamaiyas had a lower pay per day than daily laborers 
at that time. The lower pay was compensated by the security of receiving food every day, but 
they also had to work hard, compared to daily laborers. So the overall conclusion is that kamaiyas 
were guaranteed a reasonable income every day, but they had to work long hours. Taking into 
account this trade-off it appears that the empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical 
model where there is a utility equivalence between being a casual labor and a kamaiya. 
                                                 
13 The number of kamaiyas varies between different sources, probably due to revisions of the register. Our data is 
consistent with Oli (2003). 
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 Since the liberation, the kamaiyas have been better off because they received a (small) 
plot of land with a house. Furthermore, some of them are now being offered sharecropping 
contracts, quite often in the village where they used to be kamaiyas, although not necessarily with 
the same landlord. Our respondents clearly stated that sharecropping is a better contract because 
they do not have to work hard for the landlord every day. We thus have some support for 
Hypothesis 1.  
 However, this finding is less reliable than the support for Hypothesis 2. We have to rely 
on the ex-kamaiyas' comparison of the kamaiya contracts to the present sharecropping contracts, 
with the comparison being blurred by a set of other changes, such as the interventions described 
and the general increase in income. Still, the long working hours of the kamaiyas and the 
relatively low payments indicate that the judgments of the ex-kamaiyas are reliable. During our 
fieldwork in the ex-kamaiya villages we also asked for the present daily wage, and asked people 
to compared this to neighboring villages, and found no variation in wages, which is a support for 
Hypothesis 3. 
 To summarize, when we take the working hours into account we conclude that the 
kamaiya contracts were inferior to sharecropping contracts. And, we conclude that the liberation 
has led to an improvement in the contracts from the workers' point of view. This improvement 
was made possible by the intervention, through which the landlords lost their relative control of 
the laborers. The landlords, on the other hand, are probably worse off. They have to pay more for 
less work, and the value of the house and other benefits that they previously provided to the 
kamaiyas probably cannot compensate the loss. However, as discussed in the theoretical section, 
there might be a gain in terms of total surplus, since the kamaiyas have now turned into 
sharecroppers, and thus have incentives to work more efficiently. 
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 We have not seen the shift from kamaiya contracts to sharecropping contracts documented 
previously, except for an unpublished report by Gurung (2004). Gurung's team interviewed ex-
kamaiyas living in camps, and they found a variation in employment strategies, including self- 
and wage-employment. Among those who rent land, sharecropping is the dominant contract. In 
line with his findings, everyone we asked told us that the ex-kamaiyas are now on sharecropping 
contracts if they are not daily laborers. The shift also appears to turn up in the agricultural 
censuses, although the problem with those is the 10-year gap, with the liberation taking place 
only one year before the second census. Still, the statistics support our observation, see Table 2. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The table reports a relative increase in the proportion of total agricultural land that is rented. For 
example, in Bardiya the rental share has increased from 18.4% to 21.8%, which gives a relative 
increase of 18.4%. This increase in the rental shares reflects an absolute increase in land rental, 
while owner-operated farm land has declined. The exception is Dang, where both categories of 
farm land have increased. However, the year 2001/2002 was the first full post-liberation year, and 
we do not know whether the increase actually happened during that year. Adding the information 
from our fieldwork we are still confident that the kamaiya contracts were replaced by 
sharecropping contracts. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Economists have a tendency to say that any voluntary contract is beneficial for both parts. In 
contrast, we have presented a definition of bonded labor where the landlord, by way of offering 
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bonded labor as the only available long-term contract, is able to influence the laborers' outside 
option. The laborers will voluntarily accept the contract, but they would be better off if the 
contract was not available. This kind of power, where the landlord has the leverage to influence 
the laborer's outside option, is similar to Basu (1986), but the models differ. While Basu 
introduces a third part that may take an active role in the threat towards the laborers, we introduce 
a price-taking third part, represented by the casual labor market, which in our model is the 
alternative to long-term contracts. 
 Within the model, the government may play a role if it is able to counteract the leverage 
the landlord has over the laborers. The government may provide the bonded laborers with a 
credible alternative, that is, an exogenous outside option that the landlord cannot affect. This is 
what happened in Nepal in July 2000. After political pressure, the government of Nepal 
effectively ended the landlords' power, and the kamaiyas left the landlords in large numbers. The 
intervention was effective because the ban on bonded labor was supplemented by interventions 
that counteracted the laborers' tie to the landlord. The finding, that a government intervention is 
necessary, is similar to Genicot (2002), but she has a different explanation, where a ban on 
bonded labor leads to new credit options, and by that the workers are better off. 
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Table 1. Kamaiya contracts 
Reference Who is working? 
 
Payment Food Comments 
Dhakal et al. (2000) Only husband (ek saro kamaiya) Fixed pay in the range 9-11 
quintals paddy (bigaha) 
 
Meals  
 Also wife has to work (bukrahi 
kamaiya) 
 
1/4 of production (chaumali) 
 
8 quintals paddy 
(mashaura) 
No difference in pay according to loan 
(saunki). 
Sharma (1998) If wife works she seems to get paid 
10-15% of what the husband is paid. 
She may work less. 
 
Fixed pay in the range 8-12 
quintals paddy + 10%-15% of 
that weight in lentils and other 
food (masura). 
Usually also a plot of land 
for own farming. 
Variation in whether they 
get meals. 
 
Most common contract. 
 Only husband Rs 3000-4000 Meals 
 
 
 Family 1/4-1/3 of production from 1-2 
bigha land 
Variation in whether they 
get meals. 
 
 
Rankin (1999) Women and children work 
sometimes for meals. If full time 
(kamlari), then half pay of husband. 
Fixed amount of grain, which 
depends on the kamaiya's 
abilities. 
Meals is kisan's house Work alongside the smallholder kisan, 
with relatively normal hours.  
This contract is most common for 
Rana-Tharu. 
 
 Women work occasionally (bukrahi), 
or more permanent (kamlari), with 
no extra payment, but some get 
meals. 
 
Paddy (bigaha) (Masura) This contract with landlords (jamindar) 
is most common for Dangaura Tharu.  
Our findings Wife works for meals either full, or 
part-time. In some cases for a regular 
(low) wage. 
Fixed amount of paddy as 
bigaha (for example 720 kg), or 
1/3 of production 
680 kg paddy + 100 kg 
other food items as 
masura, or meals 
Masura is most common for single 
kamaiya. If 1/3, then meals. 
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Table 2: Increase in land rental 
District Land rental 
1991/1992 
Land rental 
2001/2002 
Relative increase 
in land rental 
Dang 17.3% 17.7%   2.2% 
Banke 13.5% 17.0% 26.7% 
Bardiya 18.4% 21.8% 18.4% 
Kailali  5.5%  7.4% 33.3% 
Kanchanpur  3.0%  4.7% 55.7% 
Source: Agricultural censuses, Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal. 
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